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The question of the nature of the legal authority exercised in Malta by British 
officials prior to 1813 has been a rich source of debate and controversy. The 
moment at which the British officials had a legal power to exercise full 
legislative and executive authority is elusive, despite its prominence as a 
seminal moment in Maltese constitutional history.  
 It is true that, as far as United Kingdom (U.K.) constitutional law is 
concerned, the legal effects of conquest and cession are similar as regards the 
authority of the Crown to legislate for an acquired territory.1 However, this 
principle does not remove the importance of resolving which of these 
possibilities explains British authority in Malta prior to 1813. Whether legal 
authority arose because of cession or conquest matters because, as we shall 
discover, the events on which these alternative possibilities are founded 
occurred at different times. If, for example, cession explains the legal and 
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constitutional authority of the British Crown in Malta, we need an explanation 
of the legal source of that authority prior to cession. 
 It is proposed to revisit some of the arguments concerning the question 
of British legal sovereignty over Malta, and thus the nature of the authority 
exercised by the British Civil Commissioners who held office prior to Sir 
Thomas Maitland.2 In particular, we shall examine the moment at which 
sovereignty was acquired by the British, as well as the  cause  of this transfer. 
 The decision of the Privy Council in Sammut v Strickland 3 made it a 
settled proposition of U.K. law that the ‘sovereignty’ of Malta had passed to the 
British Crown at least by October 1813.4 This was the date of the first 
appointment of a British official with the title of ‘governor’ (Sir Thomas 
Maitland) and his publication, in Malta, of a Proclamation in the name and on 
behalf of George III to the effect that the King had determined ‘henceforth to 
recognise the people of Malta and Gozo as subjects of the British Crown and as 
entitled to its fullest protection’.5 British ‘sovereignty’ was confirmed 
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unambiguously in international law by the Treaty of Paris 18146 and the 
subsequent Congress of Versailles 1815. However, the decision of the Privy 
Council did not resolve the vexed question of the source of British authority 
between 1800 and 1813, which continues to be a subject of speculation.  
 The Privy Council in Sammut v Strickland accepted that voluntary, 
informal, cession was recognised in United Kingdom law and that it had the 
same legal effects as formal cession; but doubted whether this was the case for 
Malta.7 The decision does not resolve fundamental questions affecting the 
period between 1800 and 1813. This is so because the appointment of a 
governor in 1813 is compatible with the confirmation of ‘sovereignty’ which 
had transferred earlier but which, for political reasons, could not be openly 
asserted.8 In other words, the possibility exists that ‘sovereignty’ had vested in 
the British Crown prior this legal and political fact being acknowledged in 
1813. Modern commentators accept that there is no confident consensus on the 
issue of both the moment and the cause of British legal authority.9 
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NORMATIVE AND POSITIVE CONCEPTIONS OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 
When considering the moment at which British officials had full legal authority 
to exercise executive and legislative power in Malta it is best to avoid seeking a 
general definition of ‘sovereignty’ because of the contested nature of the term.10  
For present purposes we are considering the moment at which the British 
Crown enjoyed a convincing claim to the exclusive, legal, right to rule without 
attention to the claims of another state. Such a legal right is not sufficiently 
based on the simple fact of being capable of exercising force. The exercise of 
force must be compatible with some reasonable account of legitimacy as the 
basis of legal authority. Generalising from accepted positivist legal theory11 it 
can be suggested that Britain would have legal authority if (i) the rules which 
are accepted in Malta as legitimate for the governance of the territory (creating 
a significant and weighty obligation that they should be generally obeyed) 
derive their authority from an hierarchy of norms; (ii) this  hierarchy 
culminates unambiguously in British political institutions (specifically the 
Crown and the Crown in Parliament) and not others; and (iii)  and that there is 
a presumption that the commands or rules which emanate from them ought to 
be obeyed. It is not, therefore, a sufficient reason for the acceptance of the rules 
as legitimate that they are morally good or part of an efficient way of achieving 
common purposes; a necessary condition of legitimacy is their place within the 
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hierarchical normative structure culminating in British institutions whose will 
ought to be obeyed.  
 There are (at least) two perspectives on this issue. First, is the 
‘normative’ approach. This recognises legal authority, and makes it legitimate, 
in terms of a ‘normative order’. 12 By ‘normative order’, in this context, is 
meant a hierarchy of rules which determine legal authority and condition the 
way in which it is exercised. As a normative order it displays ‘autopoiesis’ in 
the sense of being self-referring; each rule is explained in terms of another, also 
valid, rule. The perspective does not require a particular individual, institutional 
will or political fact, which is outside the normative framework and necessary, 
as it were, to give the system validity.13 From this perspective, the rules of 
international law, which include the claims of the Neapolitan Crown, are 
centrally important. In this paper the opinions of Vattel will be taken as 
representative of international law. This work, which was published in 1758,14 
was considered to be an important handbook for diplomats by the end of the 
eighteenth century.15  
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The normative order can also include rules of domestic law in so far as they 
serve to define and limit the exercise of power. English law on the government 
of colonies is appropriately considered in this context.  
 The second perspective is ‘positivist’. On this account legal authority is 
not ultimately dependent upon an order of rules but on certain ascertainable 
facts. Following classical positive legal theory16, Britain would exercise full 
legal authority in Malta from when (i) it does, in fact, exercise a monopoly of 
legitimate force, (ii) it does not, in fact, accept the need to follow any other 
power, (iii) its rules are habitually obeyed by the bulk of the people and (iv) its 
rules are obeyed from the ‘internal point of view’ by officials. This last point 
means that the civil servants and judges accept that the application of a rule 
emanating from Britain as a sufficient reason.  This must be one that precludes 
the following of rules from other sources, or reasons-all-things-considered, for 
their decisions and actions.  
 Each of these perspectives will be utilised in the discussion that follows. 
Two different theses or explanations for British legal authority will be 
considered: the ‘conquest’ thesis and the ‘informal voluntary cession’ thesis. 
These theses explain the core facts of the British acquisition of power in Malta 
in different ways and the value and significance of these explanations will be 
evaluated in terms of the two general perspectives on the nature of legal 
authority referred to above. 
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THE CORE FACTS. 
The discussion interprets certain core facts of Maltese history at this period that 
are taken to be uncontroversial. In 1523 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and 
King of Sicily, granted Malta and its dependencies, to the Knights of St John 
who were responsible for the government of the island from 1530. The terms of 
the grant included a clause under which the island would revert to the Sicilian 
Crown if it were abandoned by the Order. Suzerainty over Malta was retained 
by the King of Sicily in the sense that the annual payment of a falcon was made 
as a feudal due, but, in reality Malta, under the Knights, had the principal 
attributes of a sovereign state.17 In June 1798 French forces, in the course of the 
ill-fated expedition to Egypt, landed in Malta and caused the withdrawal of the 
Knights from the island and from government. The French occupation swiftly 
led to discontent amongst Maltese people, particularly caused by the 
confiscation of money and valuable property from the Church and also from 
the secular institutions of the treasury and public bank, by taxation, and by 
military conscription. On September 2nd 1798 there was an organised 
insurrection led by prominent Maltese and supported by commanders from the 
villages which caused the French to retire to the fortress in Valetta where they 
were besieged. To break the stalemate the Maltese needed assistance. The 
effective assistance came from the British navy, commanded by Nelson who, 
first using Portuguese forces under his command and later elements of the 
Royal Navy, provided arms and a blockade of the island. The siege continued 
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and British influence increased with the active approval of a significant 
proportion of Maltese leaders. By September 1799 a British officer, Sir 
Alexander Ball, was appointed by Nelson as ‘chief director of the island’ with 
final responsibility for civil government. Ball’s authority at this time was that 
of the Neapolitan, not the British, Crown. In December 1799 British armed 
forces, a force of about 1200 soldiers and marines, landed on Malta and so the 
administrative presence was significantly bolstered. The besieged and 
blockaded French forces eventually surrendered on the 5th of September 1800, 
but did so solely to the British military commander, Sir Thomas Pigot. Maltese 
representatives and Ball, the representative of the Neapolitan Crown, were 
excluded.  
 Following the surrender, the military rule under Pigot operated in 
parallel with Ball’s continuing civil administration, the authority of which, at 
least nominally, continued to be the Neapolitan Crown. Ball was recalled in 
February 1801. Fears of a solely military government by Britain were allayed 
in May 1801 when Charles Cameron, described in the Instructions he received 
from the British Crown, as ‘civil commissioner’, was appointed. Sir Alexander 
Ball succeeded Cameron in July 1802 but not as civil commissioner, rather as 
‘minister plenipotentiary to the Order of St John’. The context for this was that 
in March 1801 a new British government had opened peace negotiations with 
the French. A significant term of the resulting Treaty of Amiens was the 
restoration of the Knights of St John to Malta. A Neapolitan garrison, intended, 
by the Treaty, to replace British forces, arrived on Malta. The restoration of the 
 9 
Order was deeply opposed by many if not all significant opinion in Malta and 
on June 15th 1802 a Declaration of Rights18 was issued under the authority of 
the Congress of the Islands of Malta and Gozo declaring that the ‘King of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is our Sovereign Lord, and his 
lawful successors shall, in all times to come, be acknowledged as our lawful 
sovereign’. The Treaty of Amiens was never implemented (a major dispute was 
over Malta) and the war resumed in May 1803. At that time, May 1803, Ball 
was appointed ‘civil commissioner’ and he successfully obtained the removal 
of Neapolitan troops. Ball continued as civil commissioner in this, his second 
administration, until his death in October 1809. His successor was the military 
commander, Major-General Hildebrand-Oakes who was himself replaced in 
1813 by Sir Thomas Maitland, the first to be described by the British as 
‘Governor’. 
 Leading authorities on Malta disagree on the interpretation and 
significance of these events. The ‘formal cession’ thesis is approved in Sammut 
v Strickland and by Hardman.19 According to this argument, the legal status of 
Malta position only loses it ambiguity in 1813 with the appointment of Thomas 
Sir Thomas Maitland as the first official properly entitled to be called 
‘Governor’. This argument is flawed because  it poses rather than resolves the 
question with which we are concerned, namely the entitlement of the British 
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Crown in relation to Malta prior to that date.   For this reason it will not be 
discussed further.   
 
What will here be called the ‘conquest thesis’ argues that, by 1800,  the British 
Crown legally possessed a right to rule by right of military conquest. The thesis 
is founded in particular upon evidence that the French forces occupying 
Valletta surrendered exclusively to the British. 
 
 The ‘voluntary-informal cession’ thesis, on the other hand, asserts that a 
necessary component to the British right to rule was a form of voluntary 
submission by the Maltese through their representatives; the Declaration of 
Right of 1802 being the most important expression of this consensual act. On 
this view the Maltese had obtained the right to cede their country, through their 
own actions in expelling the French, who had, in turn, assumed sovereignty on 
the basis of a conquest and the expulsion of the Order of St John. 
 
CONQUEST 
The conquest thesis was adopted by the contemporary British author, Granville 
Penn, writing in 1805.20 He seems to have considered that the French surrender 
was a sufficient basis for full legal authority, 21 an authority that was confirmed 
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or endorsed by the consent (what he called the voluntary suffrage) of the 
population.  
 Unsurprisingly, the conquest thesis was adopted by British officials later 
in the Nineteenth Century in the context of preparing the constitutional reforms 
of 1836. The position accepted by Lord Glenelg, then the Secretary of State, 
was that, between conquest and voluntary cession, the better view of the 
acquisition of British legal authority was conquest (i.e. in 1800) confirmed by 
an act of cession by the Neapolitan Crown at Paris and Versailles in 1814 and 
1815 respectively. It was, for Lord Glenelg, the better view because it involves 
a definite acquisition of sovereign power not open to the constraints and 
qualifications that can be read into any voluntary cession dependant on the 
consent of the Maltese.22 
 The argument for a transfer of sovereignty by ‘conquest’ has two 
necessary features. First, that the ‘right’ flows from the exercise of military 
force which is decisive of the outcome and which is self-directed in the sense 
that it is not under the acknowledged authority of some other command. The 
question is whether something more is required. In ‘Foltina’23 British courts 
suggested that, as a matter of British law, the right to rule a territory was 
obtained from the moment of effective military control; that the ‘right’ and the 
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power coincide with each other. Roberts-Wray, however, suggests that some 
form of manifested intention to rule is also needed. An example of such an 
intention would be installation of an effective civil government; mere military 
rule is not enough.24 International law may be more demanding in that 
sovereignty can only transfer, lawfully, on the basis of ‘subjugation’, not 
conquest alone but through formal annexation after the cessation of 
hostilities.25 
 In what follows it will be assumed that the ‘conquest thesis’ is at its 
most compelling when the fact of military control is linked to the manifestation 
of an intention to rule. The claims and credibility of the thesis will be discussed 
on that assumption.  
 
Conquest: assessment 
There is no doubt that British military forces, first the Royal Navy (from 
September 1798) and the army (from December 1799), played an important 
role in the defeat and removal of the French armed forces. The argument for 
conquest is that this role was decisive. The claim is that, but for the British 
interventions, the blockade of the French would have gone on much longer and 
may even have unsuccessful. In particular, it is suggested that the siege had the 
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seeds of disaster within it unless it could be brought to a successful conclusion 
quite quickly. The siege relieved the French of their responsibilities to feed and 
supply the population but made it easier to feed and supply themselves. 
Without the British blockade of the harbour through which the French forces 
sought to supply themselves and, later, assistance in the land battle from British 
troops, the siege may have become a burden on the Maltese greater than the 
population could bear.26 The British claim to have been the decisive military 
force is focused on the blockade which, after the initial Portuguese involvement 
albeit on British instructions, was undertaken by British forces.  
 The claim of conquest is more challengeable in respect of the role of 
British land forces. Maltese representatives, it seems, regarded these forces as 
‘auxiliaries’ simply assisting their insurrection and conquest of most of the 
island from the French27. Furthermore, there was some belief that British troops 
hindered the action by abandoning some of the ‘unhealthy’ forward posts and 
by desertion to the enemy;28 and it was noted that whilst the Maltese lost some 
300 casualties during the siege, the British lost none. It needs also to be 
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remembered that from February 1800 Neapolitan troops were also present in 
the Malta assisting the siege.29 
 The claim that the role of the British armed forces was decisive is 
reinforced by the fact that it was the British commander, Major-General Pigot, 
who received the French offer of terms of capitulation, conducted the 
negotiations and agreed and signed the articles of capitulation on September 5th 
1800. In these negotiations Pigot made no reference either to Sir Alexander 
Ball (then, at least in formal sense, representing the Neapolitan Crown30) or to 
Maltese representatives. The claim made by some supporters of the cession 
thesis,31 that that capitulation was signed on behalf of His Britannic Majesty 
‘and his allies’, is not supported by the text.32 The exclusion of the Neapolitan 
and Maltese presence seems to have been at the insistence of the French 
commander, General Vaubois, who was reluctant to recognise either as a 
legitimate power.33 Major-General Pigot was content to accede to this refusal. 
His view was consonant  with the conquest thesis. He later wrote: ‘The Maltese 
had certainly made great exertions and were entitled to a great deal of merit for 
                                              
29
 A. V. Laferla, British Malta, Valetta 1938, Introduction  V. 
 
30
 Laferla, IV 
 
31
 Stoddart CJ’s first Report of 1836 into the Maltese Legal system, PRO CO/158/91. 
 
32
 See, for example, Article 11 of the Articles of Capitulation which expressly excludes other troops 
(appendix to Stoddart CJ’s reports, PRO CO158/91); see also Hardman, 322. 
33
 Laferla, XII 
 
 15 
their bravery and perseverance yet, with all their exertions, could never have 
compelled the French to surrender without the British fleet and army’.34  
 Military victory and subsequent military control may, as suggested 
above, not be sufficient for the acquisition of a right, of legal authority to rule. 
The assumption in this paper is that there must also be evidence of an intention 
to rule. A manifestation if this intention may not only include the establishment 
of a civil government but also an intention to exclude the claims of others, 
including a denial not just of the power of others but also of their right. If such 
actions are then effective in the sense of obtaining habitual obedience of the 
population and official rule-following from the ‘internal point of view’, a 
reasonable claim that can be made.  
 The evidence is that the British military was, after the French surrender, 
prepared to act, with the authority of a conquering power, i.e. in ways that 
implicitly denied any duty to consult or deal with any other party. Apart from 
the bitterness of their exclusion from the surrender negotiations, the Maltese 
representatives considered that the British ignored their interests in the way in 
which the removal of the French was achieved. In particular, the British failed 
to take steps to secure compensation for the spoliation that had been a feature 
of the French occupation. The British did not accept the French offer of 
hostages35 as a guarantee for the repayment of monies taken by the from the 
Università and other institutions, such as the Monte di Pieta; and they failed to 
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insert any clause in the Articles of Capitulation indemnifying the private 
property rights of the Maltese.36 Furthermore, the British furnished transports 
to carry the French garrison and its spoils to French ports. The British attitude 
contributed to the political and administrative difficulties that tainted the first 
decade of the British administration of the island. 
 Evidence of an intention to rule to the exclusion of others can be found 
in statements of intention, in the implications of actions, and from the way in 
which the formal rights of others were denied. Pigot’s refusal to admit the 
Neapolitan or Maltese interest into the surrender negotiations with the French 
has already been noted. At the time of the negotiation he also ordered the 
lowering of the Neapolitan colours, which, under Nelson’s supervision, had 
flown alongside the British flag.37 As regards recognising the claims of the 
Maltese, which the British might have been expected to do had they seen 
themselves as acting in merely a protective role,  Pigot dissolved the Congress 
of the Maltese which Ball had convened during the siege in order to govern that 
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part of the island not occupied by the French. Pigot had been instructed that 
‘…it was not proposed to share with other parties the advantages to be derived 
from the conquest of Malta’,38 and, as he later explained, his orders in relation 
to the capitulation were intended to ensure that Malta could be regarded as a 
conquest of Britain.39  Ball, it seems, was of the same view and, later, 
emphasised that his Congress was only formed to co-ordinate the activities of 
the Maltese and preserve public order;40  it was not a revival of the so called 
‘Consiglio Popolare’, nor was it intended to be a representative body exercising 
legislative powers in peace time.41 More generally, and despite the fact that he 
was formally the representative of the Neapolitan Crown, Ball, effectively 
exercised the civil government between September 1799 and February 1801. 
He pursued policies intended to obtain Maltese support for British rule. 
Notably, he revived the institutions of the government as well as the paternalist 
polices of the ancien regime.  Controversially, (because of the cost to the 
British taxpayer), he re-established the Università, which controlled  the prices 
of staple foods; the Monte di Pietà, which provided cheap finance, was also 
reinstated; as well as  the hospitals to provide health care.42 
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 The most compelling evidence of a British intention to take on sovereign 
legal authority for Malta following the military occupation  came in May 1801. 
After a brief period of exclusively military rule under Pigot, Charles Cameron 
was appointed ‘civil commissioner’. Cameron’s letter of appointment included 
Royal Instructions in which Malta is described ‘as a dependence of the Crown 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain….’. Other parts of the Instructions 
reveal that, for the British, the sovereignty in the island now vested in the 
Crown. This is explicit, for example, in the section on taxation: ‘a great part of 
the public  Revenue of the Island was derived under the Order of St John of 
Jerusalem, should continue to be managed and enforced upon the former 
footing with such alterations only as the Change of Circumstances by which the 
right of Sovereignty formerly vested in that order, but now exercised by His 
Majesty have rendered obviously requisite (emphasis added).’  These words 
make it clear that sovereignty, ‘formerly vested’ in the Order, had, by 14th May 
1801, transferred to the British Crown. Earlier, in a treaty concluded between 
His Britannic Majesty and the Dey of Algiers dated 19th March 1801 
concerning the release of Maltese held in slavery, there is the following recital:  
‘Whereas the Island of Malta has been conquered by His Britannic Majesty’s 
arms, it is now hereby agreed and fully concluded…that the inhabitants thereof 
shall be treated upon the same footing as the rest of His Britannic Majesty’s 
subjects, and the said island shall be considered in all respects like the other 
places subject to the Crown of Great Britain……’.43  The Maltese are to be 
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treated like other British subjects; a treaty indicating less certainty as to the 
status of the Maltese would have required the Maltese to be treated ‘as if’ they 
were British subjects. The recital also records the official British view that 
Malta was acquired by conquest.44  
 The conquest thesis can also claim habitual obedience from the bulk of 
the population. There is no evidence of any actual revolt against British rule 
though there is evidence of serious dissatisfaction, threatening revolt, 
particularly over the negotiations leading to the preliminary Treaty of Amiens 
in the summer of 1801,45 as well as fears about its implementation a year later. 
The point of such dissatisfaction, at least for the Maltese representatives, was to 
seek proper protection from the British, rather than a rejection of British rule; 
nor was it a preference for some other constitutional settlement. This desire was 
subsequently clearly manifested in the Declaration of Right 1802, which is 
discussed below. The fact that the Definitive Treaty of Amiens was not 
implemented meant that the issue was not put to the test.  
 As mentioned above, a defining feature indicating the factual existence 
(under positivist legal theory) of a legal system and, therefore, the claim that 
governance is law-based, is that the officials follow the rules in question ‘from 
the internal point of view’. British officials, nor surprisingly, followed 
instructions from London, and nowhere else, in the aftermath of the 
establishment of British military and civil power. This is best illustrated in 
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respect of Ball who followed British instructions despite being formally the 
legal representative of the Naples. It is the position of Maltese officials which 
is more important. There is no evidence of dissension from British rule other 
than during the period of the Amiens negotiations. These negotiations did raise 
the question of the legitimacy of British rule not only for political 
representatives but also, it seems, for officials.46 In fact the position of officials 
was not really put to the test. The Amiens problem disappeared in the late 
summer and Autumn of 1802 as the British reluctance to give effect to its terms 
became apparent. More importantly it was British policy to retain Maltese 
occupancy of  a high proportion of civil offices and to revive and continue the 
long standing institutions of Maltese public life,47 though the number of British 
office holders increased significantly from 1803.48 
 The position of the Maltese judges is similar. In the instructions to 
Charles Cameron, in his letter of appointment of May 1801, it is made clear 
that there is to be no imposition of British law but, rather, the continuation of 
existing Maltese law.49 Following this. Cameron’s first proclamation to the 
Maltese people, of the 15th July 1801, promised to uphold the laws and to 
respect the ‘dearest rights’ of the Maltese, their persons, property and holy 
religion.50 For example, in an address to the Maltese judiciary on 11th 
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December 1800, Lord Keith wrote that they were under the ‘protection’ of the 
British nation;51 a formula that conspicuously avoids an explicit claim as to 
where legal sovereignty resided. The Maltese judiciary were not required not 
apply the laws in the name of the British Crown. The judges, therefore, are 
relieved of the need to deal with a conflict between British and Maltese law and 
can follow the latter ‘from the internal point of view’ without contradicting any 
alleged obligation to British law.  
 The continuation of Maltese law is also a requirement under the 
normative approach to the transfer of sovereignty or legal authority in a 
country. Under British law, the existing, non-British, legal system was retained 
for a conquered country ‘until they are altered by the conqueror’.52 This is 
consistent with the complementary assertion of the right of the British Crown 
to alter the law as it saw fit and, in the case of Malta, choosing not to do so.53 
Local laws would be abrogated if they were inconsistent with an Act of 
Parliament extending to the country in question, or if they were ‘repugnant to 
the fundamental religious or ethical principles of Europeans’.54 Continuation by 
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the conqueror of local laws is also consistent with ‘legal’ sovereignty as 
defined in international law. Vattel considered that international law limits a 
conqueror (for how long is not made clear) to ruling on the basis of existing 
laws, where, as in Malta, the quarrel occasioning the conquest has been against 
a sovereign (here, the French in 1799) rather than an aggressive people.55 
 According to the ‘conquest’ thesis, therefore, the British Crown is 
exercising legal authority which is legitimate from, at least May 1801 when the 
intention to rule was manifested by the appointment of a civil commissioner. 
First is the fact of unchallenged military occupation on the basis of which 
British forces exercise the monopoly of force; second, the evidence of the 
British intention to rule as sovereign, to the exclusion of other claims; third, the 
fact of habitual obedience by the majority of the population, for what ever 
reason, to British rule (the response to Amiens was to seek a closer union with 
Britain), and, fourth, the fact that at least the most senior officials followed 
their instructions ‘from the internal point of view’ as reasons for their actions 
(albeit that the principle of continuity meant this was never tested) and that 
these instructions reflected the will of the British Crown and no one else. 
 But the conquest theory has to explain various obfuscations of British 
policy.  Conquest without an intention to rule as sovereign does not create a 
convincing case for the transfer of fully legitimate legal authority. The 
evidence of  Britain’s intention to rule, given above, can be contrasted with a 
range of different signals of intention that the British were giving out during the 
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same period. For supporters of the ‘formal cession’ thesis, such as Hardman, 
these obfuscations indicate the lack of clear intention on the issue of legal 
authority. 56  
 Examples of such obfuscations are, that after British military dominance 
was obtained various steps were taken, such as the lowering of the Neapolitan 
flag, that appear as denials of Neapolitan legal sovereignty. Nevertheless, there 
were assurances made that this act did not imply offence to the Maltese, the 
Neapolitans or Russia;57 and Britain, through its ambassador in Naples, was 
claiming that there was no decided intention of permanent possession.58  
 As regards the Maltese, there was a reluctance by the British to make 
any intention to declare openly that the British were exercising sovereign 
authority. General Pigot’s first proclamation to the Maltese, 19th February 
1801, was similarly guarded.59  In July 1801 Cameron, the ‘civil commissioner’ 
broached the idea of a formal declaration that the Maltese were subjects of the 
British Crown, but this was resisted in a way that suggested that Britain 
continued to hedge its bets, particularly, as mentioned below, in the context of 
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the Amiens negotiations.60 In the Royal Instructions of 1813 to Sir Thomas 
Maitland, the first Governor of the Island, there appears the following:  ‘…the 
anxious desire which the Maltese were understood to possess of being 
acknowledged publicly as subjects of the British Crown has favoured the 
disposition of His Majesty’s Government to establish the civil authorities of the 
Island upon a permanent footing…’61 (emphasis supplied). This, of course, can 
be read as implying an earlier acquisition of a right to rule which has merely 
lacked public acknowledgement, or of an earlier uncertainty as to the right to 
rule which has now been resolved in favour of establishing a permanent 
government. 
 The conquest thesis understands these matters not as weakening the 
claim that legal sovereignty, in the sense of legal authority to rule, passed at 
least by May 1801 if not September 1800, but as indicating the exercise of such 
sovereignty. The obfuscations indicate a political uncertainty not an uncertainty 
as to legal right. The positivist, political, conception of sovereignty is 
compatible with the idea that there can be legal limitations on how it is 
exercised and so accepts the idea of holding legal authority in order to transfer 
it. Similarly the normative conception of legal authority has no difficulty with a 
bona fide transfer of sovereignty which is short lived and involves a further 
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transfer. This is expressly accepted, by British law, in ‘The Foltina’62. By 
March 1801, when the Addington Ministry took office in London, Britain was 
preparing to enter negotiations at an international level in which it would 
deliver up the island to the Order of St John, and so any clear assertion of 
sovereignty, at the diplomatic level or publicly to the Maltese, would have, on 
balance, increased political difficulties. The policy of temporary occupation 
became obvious in the terms of the Preliminary Treaty of Amiens concluded in 
October 1801. In this agreement the British government undertook to permit 
the restoration of the Order of St John to Malta under the protection of the 
Russia. The Definitive Treaty, by contrast, reflected determined and effective 
Maltese opposition to the terms of the preliminary Treaty63 at least to the extent 
that Article X, though continuing to provide for the restoration of the Order, 
also required the neutrality of the island, the withdrawal of British civil and 
military authorities, the establishment of a Neapolitan garrison (intended to be 
present only until the Order could raise sufficient forces to garrison the 
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Islands64) and, in particular, enhanced the political rights for the Maltese, 
particularly in so far as the Grand master of the Order  was to be elected from 
amongst the native Maltese. Under the conquest thesis these are simply 
political questions concerning the future of the island and should not be 
conflated with the question of the legal right to rule: the two are distinct issues.  
 Subsequent events, under the conquest thesis, simply reinforce the claim 
that a legitimate, legal right to rule had passed to Britain at least by May 1801. 
In June 1802 Sir Alexander Ball had been appointed as the minister 
plenipotentiary to the Order of St John under instructions to implement the 
Treaty by arranging for the evacuation of the British forces and their 
replacement by Neapolitans65. Upon his arrival on 10th July 1802 he took over 
from Cameron and, without the title, exercised the functions of Civil 
Commissioner. Neapolitan forces arrived in when. But by the Autumn of 1802 
there were developing British doubts about the advisability of implementing 
the Treaty of Amiens. These were caused by Russia’s refused to guarantee the 
neutrality of 1sland, by fear that the ultimate outcome of the Treaty would be 
the re-acquisition of Malta by the French because the Neapolitans were 
effectively in the hands of France, and by continued French expansion on 
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matters not covered by the Treaty, such as the annexation of Piedmont in the 
Autumn of 1802. This expansion could be counterbalanced by Britain using 
Malta to strengthen its strategic presence in the Mediterranean and better 
protect the route to India. Despite the recognition, in his title, of Neapolitan 
sovereignty, Ball clearly took his instructions from London and exercised his 
powers on that basis. Secret instructions were sent to Ball in October 1802 
ordering him to suspend the evacuation of British forces altogether,66 and Ball 
refused to admit the Grand Master when he insisted on travelling to Malta to 
take possession of the government in accordance with the Treaty. The evidence 
that Britain was not complying with the Treaty in respect of Malta was the 
principal, ostensible, reason for the renewal of hostilities in May 1803. Ball 
was appointed Civil Commissioner in May 1803 and immediately instructed 
the removal of Neapolitan forces from the Island. This was so  because 
domination of the Kingdom of Naples by Napoleon meant that accepting 
Neapolitan rights over Malta would have been tantamount to handing control to 
the French.  These actions are an unequivocal denial of both politically and 
legally based sovereignty over Malta by the Neapolitan Crown. Under the 
conquest thesis such a denial is consistent with the fact and right of Britain to 
exercise proper, legal, authority in Malta, a right which has been convincingly 
established since 1801. 
 In summary the conquest argument is that effective military control (the 
ability to exercise the monopoly of force) was with British forces from 
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September 1800 and there was a clear intention to rule at least by the 
appointment of Cameron in charge of civil government in May 1801. Senior 
officials regarded the British Crown as source of final authority. Obfuscations 
in British policy are indications of perfidiousness or of political but not legal 
uncertainty and the policies underlying the Treaty of Amiens are exercises of 
sovereignty, not reasons for doubting its existence. The limited concern 
demonstrated by the British for the views of the Maltese and their 
representatives illustrates the behaviour of a conquering sovereign rather than a 
protector or occupier with delegated and limited powers. Of course, a difficult 
legal test was avoided by the early decision to continue with existing Maltese 
laws and institutions. This was not only removed the likelihood of a conflict 
between British and Maltese law coming before the Maltese courts, thus 
requiring the judges to disclose their constitutional allegiances, but is also 
compatible with the norms appropriate to a conqueror of an enemy power a 
distinct from an enemy people. Under the conquest thesis this policy of 
continuity pursued by British administrators is thus an important signifier of the 
transfer of sovereignty rather than the converse.   
 
Voluntary Informal Cession 
 29 
A strong proponent of the voluntary informal cession thesis is Roberts-Wray.67 
His principal argument is that the British Crown acquired Malta following a 
voluntary cession by its people in 1802. The position is also, of course, the 
preferred view of both the Maltese and British courts, in the Twentieth 
Century, as expressed in Sammut v Strickland68 and, following that case, it is 
endorsed by Halsbury’s Laws of England.69  There was also strong assertion of 
the voluntary cession thesis by contemporaries. Thus elected Deputies in a 
‘Humble Representation of the Deputies of Malta and Gozo’ in October 1801,70 
referred to how they ‘gave up their country’ (or ‘consigned the government’) to 
the British and obeyed the British generals who they treated as ‘ministers of the 
sovereign their hearts had elected’. The central document on which voluntary 
cession is based is the Declaration of Rights of July 1802, signed by Maltese 
deputies. The British maverick official, William Eton, who campaigned against 
the British administration and supported a restoration of Maltese governmental 
traditions, also argued for cession71. The voluntary cession thesis was also 
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strongly asserted, to the irritation of British government officials, by Chief 
Justice Stoddart in his reports of 1836.72 Maltese constitutional theory is also 
predominantly supportive of the voluntary cession thesis.73 
 
Informal Voluntary Cession, assessment. 
The argument for voluntary informal cession is an argument of right in the 
sense that it does not, like the argument for conquest, depend upon the fact of 
having power and being obeyed. Rather the argument is that informal voluntary 
cession is the best interpretation, in normative terms, of the fact that, in the 
early years of the nineteenth century, British officials, obeying instructions 
from London, were habitually obeyed by the Maltese in general, and officials 
in particular, in ways that indicate that a transfer of legal authority had taken 
place. 
 Voluntary informal cession requires there to be a polity for the Maltese, 
through there representatives, to cede. There are two possibilities canvassed. 
One is that Malta, under the Order, already had the attributes of sovereignty.74 
This sovereignty may or may not have passed to the French after their 
occupation or conquest in 1798. In any event it was restored to the Maltese by 
their role in the siege and was then ceded to the British. The other is that Malta 
remained, during French occupation, under the formal sovereignty of the 
Neapolitan Crown, but that the failure of Naples to protect the Maltese from the 
                                              
72
 Stoddarts’ Reports. See  PRO  CO158/91. 
 
73
 Cremona The Maltese Constitution, San Gwan 1997, Chapter 1.  
74
 Pirotta, 5. 
 31 
French left the Maltese free, a natural right recognised by international law, to 
protect themselves in the most effective way open to them-a form of 
sovereignty.  
 United Kingdom law recognises informal voluntary cession75. 
International law is not so clear but does not expressly deny it, Grotius is 
thought to have recognised a form of informal cession, though the passage cited 
requires the consent of the ultimate sovereign,76 in this case Naples.  Consent to 
British protection for Malta was given by Naples in February 1799; but this is 
not the same as ceding sovereignty. Vattel’s understanding of international law 
was that a state overcome by force and unable to obtain protection from its 
sovereign, is free to provide for its own safety without regard to its sovereign’s 
will.77  
 Cession, as a thesis explaining the legitimacy of British rule (the 
acceptance of British authority to rule as a matter of law and subject to the 
claims of no others), cannot explain an unconditional transfer of the right to 
rule to Britain; it cannot explain a state of affairs in which the Maltese are to 
enjoy equality with British subjects under the constitutional law of the United 
Kingdom. According to the thesis, voluntary informal cession is justified by 
reference to facts which indicate a highly conditional attitude by the Maltese to 
their subordination to Britain. In particular the Declaration of Rights June 1802, 
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which is seen as the central moment of voluntary cession,78 is clearly 
conditional. In it a Congress of the islands of Malta and Gozo79, declared that 
‘the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is our Sovereign 
Lord, and his lawful successors shall, in all times to come, be acknowledged as 
our lawful sovereign.’ However, the transfer of sovereignty is conditional upon 
the satisfaction of a range of demands which include the following: that Britain 
has ‘no right to cede these Islands to any power’ (clause 2);  that there should 
be a Maltese constitution established which is to be binding on and limiting of 
the power of the British government (clause 3), and that the power of taxation  
and legislation should, subject to British consent, be with the Consiglio 
Popolare (clause 5).  
 Under the conquest thesis (or any view which denies the foundational 
significance of the Declaration) the Declaration of Right is best read, not as a 
document granting sovereignty, but as a reminder to the British of their 
obligations as (already, by conquest) sovereign. Under a ‘Hobbesian’ account, 
in particular, sovereignty is unlimited other than by the duty of the sovereign to 
protect his people from lawlessness and civil war. If nothing else, the 
Declaration might be thought of as a reminder of this principle. The 
Declaration of Rights stemmed from Maltese nationalist concerns at being 
sold-out to the Order (and indirectly, through the Order’s weakness, to the 
French) by the British through the Treaty of Amiens. It was written at a time 
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when the sacrifice of the Maltese for the greater good of international peace80 
was within the British contemplation and consequential insurrection was 
threatened by some Maltese leaders.81  
 The more obvious objection to the claim that the Declaration of Rights 
is a foundational source of British legal authority is that it is there is no 
evidence of acceptance of its conditions by the British. On the contrary, the 
British seemed to have ruled Malta, certainly from the time of Cameron’s 
appointment as Civil Commissioner in May 1801, independently of Maltese 
interests as expressed through their representatives. In particular, the British 
government steadfastly refused to contemplate creating either a Maltese 
legislative or consultative assembly after the siege.82  British rule in this early 
period was characterised by institutional rebuilding and continuity, which 
hardly indicates a disinterested British concern to advance Maltese interests 
since it’s primary purpose was to cement Maltese loyalty to the British 
Crown.83 
 Under the international law of the time, the Declaration can read more 
like a request for protection rather than the transfer of sovereignty. From this a 
possibly stronger version of the voluntary informal cession thesis emerges. 
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Vattel argued that there was legal recognition at international law for a request 
for protection from a stronger state by a weaker state, including where the 
formal legal sovereign was unable or unwilling to provide protection.84 This 
voluntary subjection may be ‘on certain conditions agreed to by both parties; 
and the compact or treaty of submission will thenceforward be the measure and 
the rule of the rights of each’. If the protector state fails in its engagements, it 
loses what rights it may have had over the protected state and the latter resumes 
its former, albeit vulnerable, independence and liberty. A similar consequence 
follows if the protector state goes beyond its powers in the compact and claims 
greater authority than was agreed.85 However, if the weaker, protected, state 
acquiesces expressly, or by inaction, then, over time, the continuing, over-
reaching authority of the protector state is legitimated: ‘patient acquiescence 
becomes in length of time a tacit consent that legitimates the right of the 
usurper’86. On this view the unconditional British right to rule dates from the 
time the Treaty of Amiens had been set aside; in respect of British intentions 
this was by Autumn 1803. From that time, on this view, the Maltese 
representatives no longer threatened rebellion and, though objecting on 
political grounds to a range of British decisions, may be said to have 
acquiesced in the British right to rule, even though important terms of the 
Declaration of Right 1802 had not been put into effect. It is suggested that this 
is a more convincing explanation of the thesis of informal voluntary cession 
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than one based on the Declaration, though it is one that has a more 
indeterminate date, certainly later than July 1802. 
 By delaying the moment in which sovereignty passes until July 1802, 
the Autumn of 1803 or later, the informal voluntary cession thesis has a 
different explanation for the obfuscations, the vicissitudes, of British policy 
from after the French surrender. Where, for the conquest thesis, this is 
explained in terms of the exercise of sovereignty, the cession thesis explains it 
in terms of British uncertainty about whether or not a transfer of legal authority 
had taken place. rights and obligations, not just as uncertainty as to how to 
exercise sovereign power. The informal voluntary cession thesis also explains 
the British policy of maintaining existing Maltese laws and institutions as, 
again, a consequence of the British position as protector, not as sovereign. 
 Britain did agree to uphold the existing laws and regulations applicable 
in Malta, though, as indicated above, the official statements about this do not 
involve a promise not to change the laws, nor an undertaking to alter them only 
with the consent of the Maltese through their representatives. The cession 
theory explains the intention to preserve legal continuity as Britain performing, 
from 1800, a protective rather than sovereign role, and this interpretation can 
be reinforced by the fact that, under Cameron’s instructions, the civil and 
criminal laws are only to be changed if, in the view of the military, they are 
required for safety and defence or if the changes are ‘evidently beneficial and 
desirable, as to leave no doubt of [the change’s] expediency or of it being 
generally acceptable to the wishes, feelings and even prejudices of the 
 36 
inhabitants’. The administration of justice was to continue ‘in conformity to the 
Laws, and Institutions of the ancient Government of the Order…’ though here 
Britain did seem to reserve an unqualified right to make changes ordered from 
London or, ordered locally in respect of ‘unforeseen emergencies’ (the latter 
needed to be reported to London).87  
 However, maintaining legal continuity can also be explained in ways 
that are consistent with the conquest thesis since, as we have seen, maintaining 
the continuity of the laws of the conquered people is a requirement of the 
normative conception of sovereignty by conquest. The British conquest, if such 
it be, was for self-defence and the quarrel was with a usurper (the French). 
Where there is no quarrel with the people, the right of conquest is to dispossess 
the usurper but then ‘to rule according to the laws of the state’-so long as the 
people voluntarily submit.88 As we have stated, British officials, in maintaining 
the laws, were doing no more than that which international law, as they might 
have understood it, required of a conqueror.89 Maintenance of the laws was 
also, at least, the starting point for the right of conquest of a settled people 
under English constitutional law.  Of course, consistent with this is the right to 
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legislate if the conqueror, Britain, so chooses, and this right to legislate is only 
restricted by reference to Britain’s constitutional laws on, for example, the 
scope of the Royal Prerogative.90 The maintenance of the existing laws of the 
conquered country is either a legal duty of the conqueror or merely an act of 
prudence aimed at minimising popular dissent and constitutional dilemmas for 
the Maltese judges. It is as reasonable to interpret legal continuity as an act of 
sovereignty as it is to interpret it as evidence of the recognition of another’s 
sovereignty. The issue was not tested in the courts by a case challenging the 
vires of British officials to change the existing laws. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has focused on the problem of establishing the most convincing 
basis for Britain’s legal right to rule in Malta at the beginning of the Nineteenth 
Century. It is suggested that there are convincing reasons for acknowledging  
that the British Crown was the legitimate and sole law making authority (the 
sovereign) from, at latest, July 1801. This claim of legitimacy is based upon 
interpreting the historical events against the measure of main-stream positivist 
legal theory. This theory identifies a legal system in terms of an hierarchical 
body of rules culminating in a commanding sovereign or a politically accepted 
constitutional rule; and this body of rules is habitually obeyed (for whatever 
reason) by the bulk of the population and accepted as a necessary and sufficient 
reason for action by officials. It is also suggested that legitimate rule from this 
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date is also compatible with the broader normative structure by which 
sovereignty is defined in, particularly, international law. The view is 
strengthened, it has been suggested, by the weakness of the contrary claim of 
informal voluntary cession; the central point of whose weakness is its 
dependence on consent by the Maltese which was conditional but acceptance 
by the United Kingdom of a power to rule which was constitutionally 
unconditional. The ‘obfuscations’ of British rule in this early period (such as a 
refusal to give the Maltese a clear statement of their status and continuing to 
give assurances to the Neapolitan court that its legal title was not 
compromised) are, on this view, manifestations of Britain’s political interests 
rather than uncertainties as to its legal and constitutional rights.  
   
